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Theorising the Individual Body on Stage and Screen; or, 
the Jizz of Martin Guerre 
Richard Fotheringham 
jizz (dziz) [Etym. unknown.] The characteristic impression given 
by an animal or plant . . . A single character may supply it, or it 
may be the combination of many . . . D. McClintock Compan. 
Flowers ix 117,1 know only too well the problem of trying to 
express what there is in a plant that enables me, or you, to tell it 
from another at sight. The word I use for these intangible 
characteristics, that defy being put into words, is jizz. 
— Oxford English Dictionary 
A world comprised of permanent objects constitutes not only a 
spatial universe but also a world obeying the principle of causality 
in the form of the relationship between things, and regulated in 
time, without continuous annihilations or resurrections. 
— Jean Piaget1 
I never forget a face, but in your case I'll be glad to make an 
exception. 
— Groucho Marx 
One of the fundamental problems of theatrical communication, including 
narrated and/or enacted stories in film and television, is that of recognising actors 
and characters as they appear, disappear, and reappear. Semiotics has usually 
attempted a taxonomic solution: identifying the different channels sign systems 
involved, exhaustive elaboration of the consequent polysemic weave of information 
encoded, and only then moving on to consider the audience's ability to interpret it. 
It always has been a cumbersome set of theories, terminologically challenging and 
tending to postpone overall interpretative strategies while the wealth of detail 
accumulates. Interestingly Keir Elam, whose 1980 volume The Semiotics of Theatre 
and Drama popularised the approach, has now described the entire "semiotic 
enterprise" as, at best, "stubbornly unextinct", with its key terms and insights 
dispersed into other areas of interpretative activity, "putting an end to the dream of 
unification."2 
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The term "jizz" (OED, also "jiz"), recently borrowed by several Shakespearean 
scholars from the study of plants and animals and which refers to some indefinable 
quality which enables the recognition of one species or individual from another, 
offers a rather different relational approach to the problem—either we recognise 
or we don't. It is interesting that in disciplines such as ornithology and botany, 
with their far longer and more relentless commitment to empirical, taxonomic 
classification systems of identification and distinction, a notion of an indefinable 
"uniqueness" survives, not based on essence but on difference. Although the OED 
doesn't recognise it, the etymology of jizz is almost certainly as a comic slang 
abbreviation; the ultimate phenomenological joke at the limits to taxonomy and in 
the face of relativising and reifying abstractions: "How do you know?" "Jizz." 
["just is"]. (We should also note in passing that New Zealanders and some gay 
communities use "jiz" to refer to ejaculated semen, an interesting slippage given 
the use of DNA testing of semen to identify rapists.) 
The term (spelt with one "z") entered Shakespeare studies in 1991 when David 
Mann in The Elizabethan Player: Contemporary Stage Representation borrowed 
it—as he thought, directly and only from ornithology—in order to try to account 
for the effect achieved by comic disguise on the renaissance stage. "The Elizabethan 
player", he writes, "could not, as in a proscenium arch theatre, begin his business 
without establishing an accommodation with the spectators"3: 
The establishment of rapport by poking the head through the 
curtain seems to have been widely used by stage clowns. Many 
entrances, if not frankly comic, were potentially risible, especially 
where players were assuming parts obviously different in age, 
sex, or status from their own . . . Each actor... has his "jiz"; the 
combination of his outline, bearing, and voice. A brief moment of 
being deceived, face on, as the actor enters in disguise, is likely 
to have been succeeded by the shared amusement of recognition, 
whatever the dramatic context.4 
Mann however goes on to warn against the automatic assumption that the effect 
could only be burlesque: "imaginative involvement" by audiences was still possible, 
admiration for the impersonation might predominate, and a change in status, as in 
King Lear, might still evoke sympathy. "Disparity" [between actor and role], writes 
Mann, "was an element in the total response to the plays, as a bond between 
audience and performer, but to be called into prominence when it was required".5 
In an extension of this idea, Peter Thomson has applied the concept of jizz to 
the pre-Shakespearean clown Richard Tarlton. Thomson notes that the biographical 
legend of Tarlton, written down in Tarlton s Jests after his death, includes his 
physiognomy (hunched back, distorted features), his strutting about the stage, 
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and his explosive temper. In one story Tarlton half-fills a urine bottle with wine and 
takes it to a quack doctor for analysis, ending his exposure of the fraudulent diagnosis 
by drinking the wine and throwing the empty bottle at the quack's head. Thomson 
suggests that all these idiosyncrasies—body shape, walk, violent anarchic 
personality—are mimicked by Shakespeare in the character of Richard III, an insolent 
and dangerous clown elevated to the throne by playing roles, that the actor playing 
Richard deliberately set out to echo Tarlton's "jiz", and that audiences recognised 
the reference.6 
Two aspects of this analysis are particularly useful. First, the idea that jizz is 
not limited to one set of codes, but may extend across and select from many. We 
identify an individual by a different selection of sign elements when we see them 
from behind, or in a darkened room, or hear them on the telephone. We choose, from 
the units of meaning available, those which we know from experience are the most 
reliable in terms of their distinctiveness and permanence. Further, while we may 
suggest possible components of various sign systems that enable us to recognise 
the individual person by their body and voice in a particular real-life situation, when 
we move from reality into representation it is in mimicry that recognition is tested: 
either we recognise the reference or we don't. The other interesting feature of 
Thomson's analysis is that the phenomenon is already detached from its true 
referent—Tarlton died in 1588; performances of Richard III date at earliest from 
some years after that. But, in an age before the mechanical reproduction of images, 
movement, or sound, the referent quickly became lost; Shakespeare's Richard III in 
turn becomes an object of mimicry. This I suggest isn't jizz; the term loses its useful 
specific meaning, the unique difference of a living individual body defined by 
recognisability rather than essence, if it slips into being just another intertextual 
concept. The Elizabethan actor playing Richard III, Richard Burbage or whoever it 
was, had his own non-Tarlton, his non-Richard III, his individual body presence, 
his jizz. 
Thus while bodies are similar to other bodies, and can be mimicked by other 
bodies, they are also the visible index of an individual person. Within a Saussurean 
sign system of difference, A as different from B, C, etc, jizz insists on the sign of A 
as being more than that which it is not. We cannot simply import another unique 
shape—say a letter from the Cyrillic alphabet—and make it stand in the place of A. 
We have changed the jizz of the sign, we have placed a new body in an existing 
vacancy, we have recast the dramatic role. But we do not mistake one for the other, 
and it is both dangerous in interpersonal terms, potentially offensive in social terms 
("they all look the same to me"), and interpretatively naive in theatrical terms, if we 
do so. 
It is in relation to unique, non-replaceable bodies that theatrical communication 
offers us a rich field of experimental situations. Auditions and the use of understudies 
are both commutation tests where the different individual qualities of different 
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bodies can be explored by seeing body A or body B performing a role, while the 
performance practice of doubling roles and the narrative strategy of disguise are 
limit cases for recognising actor and role(s). Even in an act of close realistic 
impersonation of a single role, arguably an awareness remains both that this is 
actor A in the role, not actor B, and that A's unchangeable physical shape and vocal 
peculiarities provide boundaries of interpretation of the figure in the text. Further, 
and paradoxically, it is when acting virtuosity is most obviously demonstrated, in 
disguise or doubled roles, that the attempt to conceal the actor's jizz most draws 
attention to its phantom presence, as well as to the artistic flexibility required to 
produce multiple representations with the same vocal and physical equipment. 
Such an indexical function of actor and character is absolutely essential in 
making sense of a storyline, which in its pattern of entrances and exits, disguises, 
revealings, and doubling (or halving7) of roles, recalls the old conundrum of cognitive 
psychology: if the mother leaves the room, and comes back, how does the child 
know it's the same mother? To which we might add, if the mother leaves the room 
and comes back as the father, how does the child know the mother isn't a transsexual 
quick-change artist? As the child psychologist Jean Piaget noted many years ago, 
to be able to function within our community we have to learn what is changeable 
and what is stable both in the physical world (what Piaget called "object concept") 
and in other individuals (physically, intellectually, emotionally), hence perhaps our 
anxious fascination with stories in which our trust in such stability is undermined 
by characters or behaviour we consider "schizophrenic" (in the popular misuse of 
that term). 
On the live stage, however, such shifts occur more obviously as an 
interpretative game, and it is largely through recognising the individual actors' 
bodies that we make sense of their reappearances as the same character in spite of 
costume changes, aging, and disguising, and why we have to establish conventions 
to distinguish disguise from doubled roles. We draw on experiential and cultural 
knowledge to assist us in deciding what can be changed and what cannot, and what 
is unlikely to be altered to a significant degree without explanation. Thus a 
significant change of posture, or changed facial appearance (by muscle alteration 
or make-up) is likely to be read as a new role unless we are told that the actor's first 
character has aged or been involved in an accident. It is of course possible to play 
consciously with this fundamental of dramatic narrative, but such special cases 
usually foreground their violations of the norm, and quickly establish their own 
interpretative game, whether it be a Jeckyll and Hyde situation, or a meditation on 
the gap between subjective perceptions and desires and the unknowability of the 
other that provokes those reactions, as in Bunuel's That Obscure Object of Desire 
(1977), where the eponymous woman is played by two different female actors. 
The recognition of individual identity by jizz is one of the standard plot devices 
in film and television, a medium with a particular ability to close in on physical 
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detail, and to use such details to provide consistent traces of a character through a 
visual narrative. In the feature film Sliding Doors (1998), for example, two storylines 
involving Gwyneth Paltrow as the same character, Helen, alternate after the initial 
exposition shows her either catching an early train home, or just failing to do so. 
The Helen who fails to do so is mugged and wears a plaster on her head for several 
scenes. At the precise moment when she recovers and is seen without the plaster, 
the other Helen gets her hair cut and blonded. With this body marking, in spite of 
the complex interweaving of two different stories, we are never in doubt as to which 
Helen's narrative we are in. 
Such markers and key moments can carry major ideological meanings. In 
Hitchcock's Vertigo (1958) Kim Novak's ability to totally transform herself from 
Madeline to Judy by changing her hair colour and style, make up and voice, places 
women closer than men to a troubling, shape-changing unknowability that informs 
our reading of the sex/gender system activated in that text. So indistinct is the trace 
of Novak's individual body that we are unsure when James Stewart approaches 
Judy for the first time whether this is just another example of his obsession with the 
dead Madeline that has already led him to approach a series of other women who in 
some way reminded him of her. Within this understanding of the unknowable, 
betraying object of desire, it is predictable that after he and Judy have just made 
love for the first time that she makes the mistake that provides proof of identity: not 
marked on her body—which might produce reassurance—but from a talismanic 
object, the piece of jewelry which Madeline had worn. In terms of the plot, the crass 
Judy is real and the ethereal Madeline a deception, but as Molly Haskell pointed 
out many years ago, in another sense dividing representations of women into 
utopian/dystopian extremes is itself a misogynistic strategy designed to distract 
attention from the possibility of a relationship with realistic "fusion" characters (in 
Vertigo the role of Midge played by Barbara Bel Geddes).8 
Such interpretations, however, see only figures in the text, manipulated by 
screen writers, directors, and cinematographers to produce dominant patriarchal 
beliefs about women. What gets commented on far less often is the way in which an 
actor such as Kim Novak displays the ability to transform herself, and the way in 
which the two roles make us aware of the actor as individual artist, as performer. At 
the moment Stewart realises he has been tricked, we share his perspective but are 
able, if we retain an awareness of performance, to add our own admiration for 
Novak's ability to conceal her biological and cultural jizz (body, posture, voice) 
within each role. Absence of non-performing self, rather than allowing complex 
fantasy reactions, can foreground the presence of previously undetected artistry. 
However, it is here that mainstream film parts company with the theatre, in at 
least two ways. Firstly, film analysis lacks a precise focus on performance as 
something produced by a living extra-textual individual. Stephen Heath, for example, 
elaborates at length different ways of approaching the image of the actor on the 
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screen: as agent (presence in narrative), as character (an agent individualised by 
"qualities"), as person (actor), as image (the "luminous body" on the screen, the 
star), and "figure" (a totalising term, within which the above concepts circulate and 
interact).9 Useful as these categories are, none precisely explains the sense of 
difference between actor and role which is produced by unmistakable evidence 
within a text of a non-self, crafted performance: evidence which is most visible in 
doubling and disguise, or in a role played by a star actor known for other very 
different character types. Film producers and critics are often uncomfortable with 
the lack of fusion between actor and role which such performativity implies; in the 
classic Hollywood system, performance should be as anonymous as the cinematic 
apparatus. Much live theatre however sees demonstrated acting virtuosity as the 
height of artistry. 
Second, there is evidence that some of the markers of jizz, unmistakable 
individuality, can become lost in the process of transference of live performance to 
two dimensional screen representation. On the simplest level, in terms of the amount 
of perceptual information provided, this was a particular problem with attempts at 
providing narrative continuity in early film. An example is the 1908 Biograph Ostler 
Joe, directed by D.W. Griffith, where genre expectations alone allow us to make 
sense of the narrative. A wife is seen leaving her lower-class husband (the humble 
Joe) and enjoying the high life with her wealthy seducer. Shortly afterwards we see 
Joe hurrying to the death bed of a woman who pantomimically begs his forgiveness. 
There is nothing to link this figure visually with the wife—clothing, hair, posture, 
appearance, and mise en scene are all changed, and the poor quality of the print and 
the camera's distance from the subject deny us a sufficiently clear image of her 
face-but the stable moral imperatives of domestic melodrama frame our interpretation. 
This must be the wife figure, abandoned by her lover, radically changed in 
appearance and clothing and dying in despair, or the episode makes no sense 
within an integrated narrative. Closer to theatre, a recent controversial example in 
the late Richard Ellman's biography of Oscar Wilde was the identification (not by 
Ellman) of a photograph of an actor dressed as Salome as Wilde himself; an idea 
which initiated several reinterpretations of that play. However it was later discovered 
that the photograph was not of Wilde nor of any other cross-dressed male but was 
of the Hungarian soprano Alice Guszalewicz performing in Strauss's opera.10 Such 
errors are possibly widespread; ecological psychology, concerned with information 
exchanges between individuals, has been examining this phenomenon at some 
length as a problem of research method where two-dimensional photographs are 
used for studies of the recognition of faces and the qualities attributed to them.11 
While in modem film and television movement offers perceptual clues to 
individual bodies additional to those provided by the still photograph, and image 
quality is far superior to that of early cinema, the problem remains in any reductive 
representation of the temporally real. This is not contradictory to the point made 
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earlier about film's ability to use the recognition of jizz in plotting since filmmakers, 
working within the mainsteam tradition of clear story lines and knowing that the 
limitations of their medium invite confusion, work hard to foreground the unique 
body detail or the distinctive costume. Conversely, withholding jizz for the purposes 
of narrative retardation (e.g. the shadow in the doorway) is also part of this 
recognition of the power of the game of recognition. Where confusion occurs is 
where stable singularity of a body is assumed, not asserted, in long shot and subdued 
lighting, in different clothing and mise en scene. 
On the live stage, however, there exists the much more common reverse 
problem of the insistently present and individually different actors' bodies. Again, 
casting actor A in one season and actor B in another, and doubling and disguise 
within the performance text, are the experimental situations most likely to expose 
this gap between the real and the representational. The presence of twin characters 
is another pertinent example: we either find conventional (usually comic) ways to 
suspend disbelief, rely on doubling (most perfectly, in Goldoni's The Venetian 
Twins, where the twins never meet and so can be played by the one actor), or play 
against the convention (Arnold Schwarzenegger and Danny De Vito in Twins, 
1988). 
Concern about the lack of "realism" which twin roles and impersonation 
plotting cause an audience is not a modern problem of post-Stanislavsky/realist 
staging. In 1619, Ben Jonson told William Drummond of Hawthornden: 
he had ane jntention to have made a play like Plaut' Amphitrio, 
but left it of, for that he could never find two fo like others that he 
could perfiiade the fpectators they were one 1 2 
In that play the God Jupiter impersonates the Theban commander Amphitryo in his 
wife's bed, while the god's messenger Mercury impersonates Amphitryo's slave. 
What is easy for Gods and the reading imagination becomes difficult on the stage, 
and one wonders what Jonson thought of Shakespeare's reworking of this and 
another Plautine comedy, Menaechmi, to produce The Comedy of Errors, that early 
work in which twin masters and twin servants appear in a convoluted plot sequence 
which until the last scene prevents any of the characters ever seeing identical twins 
together at the same time. 
The Comedy of Errors is also a useful text to use in beginning to consider the 
ways in which writing about performance texts, and writing about performing in 
them, has been dispersed into different areas, most of which do not consider this 
phenomenological condition of staging. Since about 1980, but most significantly in 
Barbara Freedman's 1991 volume Staging the Gaze,13 a line of critical analysis has 
proposed that the situation in The Comedy of Errors, though realised in the genre 
of farce, was nightmarish for all the participants: for each twin a seeming loss of 
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individual identity, for them and everyone else an inexplicable shift in the common 
understandings on which interpersonal communication is based. To my knowledge 
this darker theme has never been explored in performance; further, in performances 
of this play, even when the roles are doubled (with the consequent awkwardness of 
the theatrical sleight of hand required to realise the denouement), in order to maintain 
the comedic tone, the audience is always told which twin is which, by subtle (or 
obvious) costume, make-up, or acted behavioural differences. What, we might ask, 
would happen if this omniscience were denied an audience, and if the actors played 
the situations with all the increasing serious desperation such theoretical analysis 
has proposed? Conversely, if such a performance outcome is unrealisable, what 
use, if any, might performance studies make of interpretative strategies such as 
those Freedman and others have promulgated? 
Such critics are not concerned with performance problems or solutions, yet it 
is not only in such interpretations that the individual performing body has been 
undertheorised. In much writing about stage performance, although the individual 
actor is recognised, named, foregrounded, what is really being analysed is the 
culture, age and gender typing of that body, not its uniqueness. But before 
proceeding to examine such discourse, we need to note a deep division in the 
approaches taken, and the methods of analysis applied, between performing arts 
training regimes and textual analysis within liberal arts education. 
Such a binary often can be discerned by what we might call the Laban/Lacan 
test: the alphabetical coincidence that in a book's index places the pioneering 
taxonomist of human movement, Rudolf Laban, immediately before the 
psychoanalytic philosopher Jacques Lacan, can be a guide to that work's 
interpretative frames of reference. So a glance at the index to Elizabeth Grosz's 
Volatile Bodies (1994) shows it to be conceptualised mainly within French 
psychoanalytic/feminist terms (Lacan, Cixous' "The Laugh of the Medusa"),14 
while Elin Diamond's edited volume Performance and Cultural Politics (1996) has 
a similar bias, though a single reference to Kristin Linklater's Freeing the Natural 
Voice shows that at least one of its authors comes from a training background,15 
while Susan Leigh Foster's Reading Dancing (1986), though by no means a 
theoretically naive or unsophisticated volume (Levi-Strauss is there as is Lacan, 
albeit in a single footnote), reverses the emphasis, drawing more extensively on 
Laban.16 
To some extent this distinction simply replicates the education/training binary, 
yet interestingly both seem to express an impatience with or an indifference to the 
individual body, albeit from different frames of reference. For the acting or dance 
teacher the body is a "neutral" object, in need of strict discipline if maximum flexibility 
and expressive ability are to be achieved. This is ideological acquiescence by 
silence: it allows the selection into acting and dance academies of bodies which are 
categorised and selected on untheorised and undeclared principles. It is only once 
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inside the academy's doors that the body adopts neutral position; here a second, 
reverse set of unacknowledged assumptions are mobilised; what is trained is the 
so-called "neutral" body, not the individual subject. 
Some performance theorists, working within critical discourse rather than 
developing training systems, also see the individual performing body as undesirably 
lacking in subversive potential. Elin Diamond for example argues that "the intensity 
o f the phenomenological spotlight" destroys "the materialist subject in its historical 
contradiction,"17 and, in conversation with the playwright Joan Schenkar discusses 
t h e frustration for the feminist director when the actor's body "will not re-form, de-
form, follow the subversions of [the playwright's] language." 1 8 Yet such 
assumptions are based on the actor as anonymous or self-effacing sign system, 
lacking presence as individual and identified only as "woman" or "man", or at best 
representing a particular cultural or gendered group. Unlike language tenns however, 
t h e particular body in performance cannot be erased, the signifier does not float, or 
does so within corporeal limits that are marked by individuality and temporality as 
well as by culture and gender. 
Some recent writing in the area has begun to notice this difficulty. Susan 
Melrose argues in "My Body, Your Body, Her-His Body: Is/Does Some-Body (Live) 
There?", that what occurs in much textual analysis is a reification of the term "the 
body" in a "fixed, categorised, reduced, generalised" process of "nominalisation"; 
a dangerous process "as soon as we attempt to account in writing for live 
performance."19 She proposes a useful distinction, that rather than thinking of "the 
body in performance," which she dismisses as "a wholly meaningless term," we 
should recognise that".. . any specific (and named and signed) performing body, 
a t any given instant, is simultaneously 'my body' (to the performer), your body' 
( to [the] director and other performers) and 'her-his body' (to the spectator)", what 
she calls a "perceptual and proprietorial grid."20 However Melrose is approaching 
the problem solely from the actor's (the encoder's) point of view, without going on 
t o address the perception by the audience of the body as individually marked and 
available for decoding as unique. 
Writing on live theatre that links the body to a notion of unique individual 
presence instead of the rather more usual categories of gender/race/class and culture 
(with the exception of studies of 'stars') is surprisingly hard to find. Again, some 
writing in film theory offers useful if partial analogies. In a long introductory chapter 
t o the 1995 volume Cinema and the Invention of Modern Life, "Tracing the Individual 
Body: Photography, Detectives, and Early Cinema," the early film historian Tom 
Gunning considers ways in which the invention of photography not only altered 
the mobility and reproduceability of individual identity, but how it immediately 
became part of the apparatus of panoptic surveillance, in Foucauldean terms.21 In 
fact the chapter works very much as an application and extension of the themes of 
Discipline and Punish into the age of the mechanical reproduction of what Walter 
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Benjamin called "permanent and unmistakable traces of a human being."22 Gunning 
draws extensively on a 1985 French study by Christian Pheline, L'Image 
accusatrice, and argues that the "detachable" image, "with a mobility its referent 
never possessed", was able to circulate freely, making it possible for governments 
to regain control over travelling bodies.23 He cites Pheline for the idea that the 
photographic image—first on passports, now on drivers' licences, credit cards, 
etc—not merely identifies but produces the individual within mass society; a body 
which can move through the crowd, across land and sea and national boundaries, 
with a "traceable accountability" reassuring to the authorities. The reproducible 
uniqueness of the individual makes possible "the exercise of political power on the 
individual's body and image."24 
Gunning goes on to consider the effect this and other technological changes 
had on storytelling. Obviously enough he concentrates on crime/detective stories: 
on the shift in both real life and narrative from accusations and the hearing of 
witnesses to the examination of material evidence. As beliefs faded that there was 
a criminal "type" identifiable by physiological difference, and as the practice of 
branding the bodies of convicted criminals fell into disfavour, complicated 
procedures for identifying individual suspects emerged.25 In the late 1880s the 
French police statistician Alphonse Bertillon established consistent physical 
postures and camera distances and in other ways standardised the photographing 
of criminals, introduced the now standard "mug" shots (full frontal and profile), and 
devised examples of similar facial types to train detectives in visual discrimination, 
while the problem of indexing the semiotic complexity of a photographic image was 
solved by sorting and filing photographs according to simpler, quantifiable 
categories. All criminals were measured firstly according to the length of their 
heads, then the width, then the length of their middle finger and on many other 
presumed unchanging/unchangeable physical characteristics. The corresponding 
photographs were sorted accordingly for future reference in case the individual 
took on an assumed name. Storytelling began to change: 
Bertillon himself recognised the congruence between his method 
and the plot mechanism of nineteenth-century melodrama. "Is it 
not a problem of this sort," he asked, "which forms the basis of 
the everlasting popular melodrama about lost, exchanged, and 
recovered children?"26 
But, as Gunning points out, when science found new answers to such problems 
which reduced social anxieties about them, they became less interesting questions 
to ask. 
If Walter Benjamin and Christian Pheline are right, that image reproduction 
profoundly altered our understanding of what individuals are, and if Gunning is 
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right in pointing to the way in which this transformed (rather than merely added 
new solutions to) the obsessions of dominant genres of storytelling, then it seems 
that the end of the twentieth century has been a key moment in which Western 
society began to see further radical shifts in both. In these years two major scientific 
advances directly confronted one another in the popular imagination. On the one 
hand DNA analysis claimed to have produced absolute certainty in being able to 
identify an individual body; on the other the cloning of sheep, calves, and perhaps 
soon humans has thrown radical doubt over that biological individuality. While 
real-life and fictional stories about stolen identity continue to circulate, particularly 
in relation to personal privacy and access to computerised information, what in fact 
is being referred to here is the theft of those portable official markers of identity: no 
longer just photographs, passports or credit card numbers but passwords, credit 
ratings, and personality profiles. This is an old genre in new technological guises, 
and a declining one. In fact what we have seen since the invention of photography 
is the reverse: a far greater degree of certainty about individual identity, a tendency 
which has now reached an absolute faith in the accuracy of scientific DNA tests. In 
a Paris cemetery the remains of Yves Montand are dug up by court order to determine 
whether or not he fathered a woman claiming to be his daughter; in Washington DC 
the Tomb of the Unknown Vietnam Soldier is exhumed to see if his identity can in 
fact be determined; in Brisbane, Australia, a man is convicted of rape and murder 
because the rapist's semen was preserved and, ten years later, its DNA was found 
to have a "one chance in 6 billion" exact match with blood taken from the suspect— 
jizz indeed.27 
As DNA has emerged as the ultimate marker of individuality, the photograph 
has declined. Popular magazines now abound in stories of how images can be 
easily manipulated by anyone with Paint Shop software on their computer, and how 
dead actors can complete their last movies. No one trusts photography any more. 
But it is not just DNA technology which provides new reassurance of our 
uniqueness: computers, we are told, will soon be able to greet us cheerily, having 
identified our approach by smell, voice, facial characteristics and smile, checking a 
variety of signals to guarantee certain identification even if we have a cold, a split 
lip or a different perfume on. Conversely scientific success in cloning animals has 
led to concern at this perceived threat to individuality; opposition, it is interesting 
to note, sometimes symbolised by wearing theatrical "neutral" masks, such as 
those worn by members of the green parties in the European Parliament in January 
1998.28 
In situations of less extreme polarities, the popular media repeatedly play with 
notions of jizz: for example on the minimum information required for recognising an 
individual (such as quiz games based on printing photographs of only the eyes of 
prominent people). Conversely news stories (e.g. about suspects in criminal 
investigations) test how much they can expose of a human figure while claiming to 
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conceal the identity of the person represented: most obviously, covering over the 
eyes in an image by a small black rectangle. Obviously, in legal proceedings, such 
token concealment does not conceal jizz from precisely that community which has 
more than superficial or photographic knowledge of the person accused and within 
which the suspect has a right not to be identified prior to the court case. The same 
is true of the various techniques used to "make anonymous" individual humans 
who are imaged on television: faces square-tiled and blurred, darkened rooms, over 
the shoulder camera shots, mechanically-distorted voices. In spite of this apparent 
concern in media coverage of court cases for the question of identification of 
witnesses or the presumption of innocence of the accused, those other great markers 
of cultural difference and individual jizz: body shape, hair and skin colour, and 
clothing type, are revealed. 
Oddly, or perhaps not so oddly after Andy Warhol, human image cloning is 
mobilised in the media for games of surface and style, apparently without activating 
anxiety about identity. A recent trend in clothing advertisements, for example, is to 
show garments worn by different models as absolutely identical—in colour as well 
as fabric, design and cut. Models themselves are often shown as cloned doubles: 
by photographic manipulation or by using people with similar body and hair types 
and wearing dark glasses. Framed by the self-knowledge that they are mobile clothes 
horses for the purposes of foregrounding dress, the beautiful people in such 
photographs combine an exuding self-confidence with complete loss of jizz. This is 
The Comedy of Errors as neither farce nor nightmare, nor even as story. The visual 
repetition disables coded narrative; by foregrounding the constructed nature of its 
own mise en scene, the self-sufficiency of each image is assured; storytelling is 
itself a decontextualised quotation. 
However, one of the major differences in dramatic narratives of the twentieth 
century is that they no longer are able to use misrecognition of a disguised figure as 
a convention. If such a trope is required, then it must be explained plausibly, or 
repositioned in appropriate non-realistic genres. This may be less true of European 
farce traditions—one thinks of Almodovar's 1991 movie High Heels, in which a 
judge who uses disguise for surveillance and sex is exposed by the fact that he has 
a mole on his penis (comparisons with evidence in the Bill Clinton/Paula Jones 
harassment case are inevitable)—but within English-speaking theatre such 
dramaturgical conventions seem to have declined around the time Oscar Wilde 
launched them into absurdity in The Importance of Being Earnest. If they are used, 
then they are handled differently. 
A much reworked legend which illustrates recent unease with a traditional 
narrative of mistaken identity is that of Martin Guerre. The original sixteenth-century 
story has been reinvigorated by two movies (The Return of Martin Guerre 1982, 
and Sommersby 1993) and a 1996 West End musical Martin Guerre by the authors 
of Les Miserables and Miss Saigon, Alain Boublil and Claude-Michel Schonberg. 
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The pre-photographic period setting for the original story makes more plausible 
the failure by a wife to recognise the husband she hadn't seen for nine years, and in 
both films the question of identity remains central to the plotting—is the suddenly— 
returned Martin Guerre an imposter or isn't he, and why and when does his wife 
begin to suspect something is wrong? What is intriguing, however, about the recent 
musical of Martin Guerre, is that it has fundamentally shifted the entire narrative 
presumption on which the legend is based: it is not a story about mistaken identity 
at all, but a tale of religious persecution. 
The original story of Martin Guerre is perfect in its resonances and dramatic 
structure as a tale of successful imposture and morally-complex unmasking, which 
presumably is a major reason why it achieved legendary status. In 1540 the poor 
peasant Martin Guerre married the wealthier Bertrande de Rols in the small French 
village of Artigat, but he was at first impotent and only after eight years of marriage 
did they produce a child. Shortly afterwards Guerre, a violent and unpleasant man 
in all accounts, abandoned his wife and son and the considerable land and wealth 
he had inherited from the de Rols family, and disappeared. His uncle Pierre Guerre 
took control of the property. Nine years later, Martin Guerre seemingly returned and 
was greeted with joy by his sisters, by others in the village with whom he exchanged 
stories about things they had done together years ago and, after some hesitation, 
was accepted back by Bertrande, who was astonished by his new-found gentleness 
and affection. However three years later, while still showing great tenderness towards 
her mate, she revealed that he was an imposter, Arnaud du Thil, a man from another 
village sixty kilometres away. The matter went to trial in 1560 in Toulouse. At first 
the judges accepted the claim of the defendant that this was a squabble over the 
valuable de Rols land initiated by the uncle Pierre Guerre, and they were about to 
order that the wife go back to her "husband" when the real Martin Guerre suddenly 
appeared, having been a soldier of fortune in Spain, where the now exposed Arnaud 
du Thil had also served, and where he may have learnt enough of Martin's life to 
begin his successful impersonation. Arnaud was burnt so that his memory would 
be "effaced forever," and Bertrande and her real husband went home to Artigat. 
Rather than obliterating the story, Arnaud's immolation was the last recorded real-
life episode in what has become a four hundred year old legend, initiated by one of 
the judges in the case who wrote a best selling book about it.29 
The recent shift in the interpretation of this story began with the historian 
Natalie Zemon Davis, who acted as a consultant on the 1982 Return of Martin 
Guerre film, and the next year published under the same title her detailed historical 
study of the incident. For Zemon Davis this was not a story of mistaken identity, at 
least as far as the wife Bertrande was concerned, but a case of complicity in a 
deception from the start, or at least from the time she and Arnaud became intimate.30 
One of the more titillating aspects of the story always has been the impostor's 
apparent ability to deceive Martin Guerre's wife even in the sexual act, but a line of 
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feminist rethinking of the legend has begun to see Bertrande not as a simple peasant 
woman and innocent dupe but as someone who set out, within the constraints of 
the customs and traditions of her time, to achieve greater control over her situation: 
in particular companionship, mutual affection, a more sexually satisfactory 
relationship, and revived influence if not control over the land which had been her 
dowry. Zemon Davis suggests that this rethinking of the relationship of husband 
and wife—Arnaud and Bertrande are supposed to have taken joy "in conversing 
day and night"—was consistent with the teachings of the new Protestant Huguenot 
reformers who had been active in the area for more than twenty years. The Wars of 
Religion broke out only two years after the burning of Arnaud, and in 1568 in 
Artigat, considered by some a Protestant stronghold, iconoclasts smashed the altar 
in the church and destroyed its idols.31 
The Boublil and Schonberg musical, the programme for which features a brief 
essay by Zemon Davis, takes this new interpretation of the legend of Bertrande 
Guerre to its extreme. It moves the events forward to the time of the Wars of Religion, 
when clandestine meetings and assumed and hidden identities were motivated by 
religion and fear of persecution rather than material avarice and sexual desire. 
Believing Martin to be dead, Bertrande persuades Amaud to impersonate her 
husband rather than be remarried to a Catholic, and many of the other villagers are 
given a religious motive for acquiescing in the deception. No attempt was made to 
cast, costume or make up the actors playing Martin and Arnaud to make them in 
any way similar (indeed, in the London staging in 1997 one actor was a much larger 
man than the other). 
While this may have produced a new and more plausible narrative, or at least 
one more in keeping with current understandings of female agency and desire, it 
destroyed the basis of the legend. Its revisions are significant however in that they 
offer a limit case for the general tendency in the modern and postmodern periods to 
discard stories of uncertainty about the identity of individual bodies. The triumph 
of science in gradually pinning down the individual—photograph, fingerprint, 
DNA—has made plots of long-term mistaken identity part of antiquity; only the 
continued popularity of stories of identical twins has survived unchallenged to link 
us to the new uncertainties which may in the future constitute stories of cloning, 
presumably about to enter popular narrative with renewed impact. One wonders 
what effect this will have on the understandings we will draw from doubling and 
disguised actors in those renaissance dramas which constitute major examples of 
the plotting of earlier times; perhaps The Comedy of Errors needs to wait for a new 
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